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Abstract. This paper describes an innovative method of the
power analysis which presents the typical example of suc-
cessful attacks against trusted cryptographic devices such as
RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) and contact smart
cards. The proposed method analyzes power consumption
of the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm with
a neural network, which successively classifies the first byte
of the secret key. This way of the power analysis is an en-
tirely new approach and it is designed to combine the ad-
vantages of simple and differential power analysis. In the
extreme case, this feature allows to determine the whole se-
cret key of a cryptographic module only from one measured
power trace. This attribute makes the proposed method very
attractive for potential attackers. Besides theoretical design
of the method, we also provide the first implementation re-
sults. We assume that the method will be certainly optimized
to obtain more accurate classification results in the future.
Keywords
Power analysis, Smart cards, Neural network, SPA,
DPA.
1. Current State Analysis
Power analysis presented in this paper is a completely
new approach in power analysis attack. The method is de-
signed to combine the advantages of simple and differential
power analyses. The proposed method uses a neural network
(NN) to determine the secret key value of the cryptographic
module from the measured power consumption. Application
of neural networks to analyze information leakage through
the power side channel has not been completely published
yet. The publications dealing with the use of NN in the
side channels cryptanalysis are mostly focused on acoustic
side channels where the NN are used for classification of the
captured records of pressed buttons on keyboard [1], [2]. In
the field of the power analysis, we found few publications
dealing with classification of individual instruction in power
consumption. These works are more or less oriented on pos-
sibilities of reverse engineering [3], [4]. Classification fo-
cused on identifying the specific values of a secret key has
not been published yet. General use of neural networks in
cryptography is focused on the application of the neural net-
works, for use in encryption and cryptanalysis. Neural net-
works are well known for their ability to selectively explore
the solution space of a given problem, therefore this future is
naturally used in cryptanalysis. Neural networks also offer
a new approach for encryption and decryption because each
function could be represented by them. Neural networks are
a powerful computational tested tool that can be used to find
the inverse of the encryption algorithm. As already described
above, the neural networks are used mostly in public-key
cryptography [5], key distribution [6], hash function [7], ran-
dom number generators [8] and in the key exchange protocol
[9] (equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman protocol).
Power analysis (PA) measures the power consumption
of the cryptographic device depending on its activity and was
characterized by Kocher in [10]. A detailed description of
the side channel sources and the division of the power con-
sumption is exhaustively summarized in the book [11]. This
book describes also the basics of the measurement methods
and experimental testbed. A detailed comparison of the mea-
surement methods and the influence of the parameters affect-
ing the results measured power consumption is discussed in
[12]. After successful measurement of the power consump-
tion, the attacker needs to process and evaluate measured
data. This processing and evaluation of measured informa-
tion is called side channel analysis, and subsequently appli-
cation of obtained information to abuse the cryptographic
device is called attack. There are two basic methods of side
channel analysis, simple and differential.
Simple power analysis (SPA) was characterized by
Kocher in [10]. During these attacks, the attacker tries to
determine the secret key more or less directly from a power
trace measured. This can make SPA attacks quite challeng-
ing in practice but the potential attackers require detailed
knowledge about the implementation of the cryptographic
algorithm that is executed by the device under attack. In the
most extreme case, this means that the attacker attempts to
reveal the secret key based on one single power trace. In
most cases, it is necessary to use statistical methods to ex-
tract the useful signal. The SPA attacks are feasible on con-
dition that the secret key must have a significant impact on
the power consumption in the attacked device. A typical ex-
ample of the SPA is the attack on the implementation of the
asymmetric cryptographic algorithm RSA (Rivest Shamir
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Adleman), where the difference in power consumption be-
tween the operations of multiplication and squaring can been
observed [13] (implementation of Square and multiply algo-
rithm). The paper [14] discussed SPA of DES (Data Encryp-
tion Standard), which was focused on determination of the
Hamming weight of the encryption key to reduce the space
needed for a brute force attack. Subsequent works were nat-
urally focused on AES implementation, e.g. the paper [15]
described the analysis measured power trace during execu-
tion S-box operation and cache access. Mangard discussed
the SPA which was focused on operation key expansion in
[16]. Another type of SPA attacks are template based at-
tacks which were introduced in [17]. Practical aspects of
these attacks have been discussed in the works [18], [19],
[20], [21]. Template based attacks characterize power con-
sumption with templates which represent mean vector and
a covariance matrix of multivariate normal distribution. The
attacker assumes that it is possible to determine templates for
certain instructions and certain sequences of instructions. If
we summarize the knowledge about SPA attacks, it is ev-
ident that there must be a strong direct correlation between
power consumption and secret key in the cryptographic mod-
ule (typical example implementation of the RSA algorithm).
In this case, the attacker is able to establish the specific secret
key value from one measured power trace. For nowadays or-
dinarily used standard encryption algorithm AES [22], SPA
method can not determine the value of a secret key but the
method can provide the attacker sensitive information such
as Hamming weight of the secret keys to reduce the space
needed for a brute force attack.
The goal of differential power analysis (DPA) attacks is
to reveal secret keys of the cryptographic module based on
a large number of the power traces that have been recorded
while the device carried out encryption or decryption opera-
tion for different input data. The main advantage compared
to SPA is that the attacker does not need any detailed knowl-
edge about the device and encryption algorithm. Therefore,
DPA is the most popular type of power analysis. Another
important difference between SPA and DPA lies in data pro-
cessing method. DPA analyzes how the power consumption
at fixed time moments depends on the processed data and the
shape of the traces (power patterns) is not important at all.
The concept of DPA attack was first described also in [10].
The basic principle was introduced on DES algorithm using
the statistical method Difference of Means. Subsequently,
possible applicable statistical tests were discussed in [23].
Fundamental simulation power models, that are an essential
part of DPA, were presented for the first time in [24] and an-
alyzed in the context of smart cards in [25]. The models are
progressively modified to improve the efficiency of power
analysis [26], [27], [28]. Important question of the impact of
preprocessing of measured data on the effectiveness of DPA
was presented in [29], [30]. Brier observed that the corre-
lation coefficient can be also used as statistical method in
DPA [31]. Nowadays, this method is one of the most widely
used and best known [32]. If we summarize the knowledge
about DPA attacks, it is evident that the attacker needs a large
number of measured power traces. On the other hand, the at-
tacker does not need detailed knowledge about the algorithm
and the device. Statistical methods enable to obtain the exact
value of the secret key even if the recorded power traces are
extremely noisy.
Power analysis as presented in this paper is a com-
pletely new approach in power analysis attacks. It uses
a typical three-layer neural network with the back propaga-
tion learning algorithm to determine the secret key from one
measured power trace. Proposed method does not use any
statistical methods to determine secret key value. Our ap-
proach is based on the knowledge of template attacks, which
characterize the power consumption by using the templates
for certain instructions associated with the secret key value,
and on the application of NN for classification in acoustic
side channel. The proposed power analysis is focused on the
AES algorithm because it is an encryption standard and the
algorithm is resistant to conventional method of cryptanaly-
sis and to a great extent in SPA. The method was designed
with the vision to combine the advantages of simple and dif-
ferential power analysis. In the extreme case, this feature al-
lows to determine the exact secret key value of AES algo-
rithm only from one measured power consumption. Thus,
the proposed method combines the characteristic advantages
of SPA and DPA methods. Experimental implementation of
power analysis was focused on power trace of the operation
AddRoundKey and operation SubBytes in the initialization
phase of the algorithm, in which the algorithm works with
the secret key. The measurement of the power consumption
was performed on a test bed which is described in detail in
papers [33], [34]. The authors build on their own work where
they implemented and tested well known SPA and DPA al-
ternatively SEMA and DEMA [33], [34], [35]. We also dis-
cussed in [36] the classification of acoustic side channel by
neural network. The paper [4] deals with reverse engineer-
ing from power trace with neural network but this work was
focused only on few instructions. In presented proposal, we
combined all previously acquired knowledge and experience
about side channels analysis. In this work, we first show the
proof of concept of this method and we intend to continue in
research.
2. Method Design
The general goal of the proposed method is to obtain
the secret key value which is stored in the cryptographic
module from the measured power trace. In the following
text, we denote the value Ksec as secret key stored in the
attacked cryptographic module and Kest represents the esti-
mate value of secret key, which was determined with neural
network. Naturally, if the method works correctly, the values
Kest and Ksec will be equal at the end of classification pro-
cess. The first proposal of the method excepted sequential
classification. In the other words, classification is realized
588 Z. MARTINASEK, V. ZEMAN, INNOVATIVE METHOD OF THE POWER ANALYSIS
byte by byte similarly as in most DPA attack. The secret key
could be byte expressed as follows: Ksec = {k1,k2, . . . ,k16}
for 0 ≤ ki ≤ 255 where i = 0 to 16 represents each step of
the method. The proposed method determines the first byte
value k1 of the secret key in the first step and the second
byte value k2 in the second step and so on. The difference
between each step is in power trace division into parts corre-
sponding to time interval where the cryptographic device has
worked with individual bytes. General scheme of the whole
method was divided into three phases:
• preparation of patterns for the secret key ki,
• preparation and training of neural network,
• classification of key estimates.
Realization of these phases allows the attacker to im-
plement one step of analysis, thus determining one byte of
the secret key ki.
At the beginning, the attacker has to prepare a training
set to train the neural network. The attacker must know the
type of cryptographic module on which he wants to realize
an attack. Typical example of suitable cryptographic module
represents smart cards with implemented cryptographic al-
gorithm [37], [38], [39]. The attacker needs to have the same
type of module completely under control (provided that the
attacker is going to attack the smart card containing a mi-
crocontroller PIC16F84, he must own the same type of the
card). If the attacker has matching cryptographic device with
implemented cryptographic primitives, it is possible to mea-
sure and record the power consumption for all variants of
secret key ki. It is not purposeful to measure whole power
waveforms but it is better to locate some important opera-
tions where the cryptographic module works with interme-
diate result and secret key. For example, convenient place
for AES algorithm represent operations AddRoundKey and
SubBytes.
The attacker uses the recorded power traces to train the
neural network. The train set corresponds to all possible
variants of the secret keys, thus the neural network should
be able to identify the correct key. After successful teaching
of neural networks, the attacker can continue with the last
phase of the method.
In the last phase, the attacker measures the power
consumption device under attack and inserts the measured
power trace on input of neural network. The neural net-
work assigns to power consumption the probability vector
that contains probabilities for all key estimates. The esti-
mate key with the highest probability should be equal to
secret key value. In this way, the value of a secret key ki
is determined. The following text describes the particular
phases of the proposed analysis, including the implementa-
tion and results of classification. Experimental implementa-
tion of power analysis was focused on power trace of the op-
eration AddRoundKey and operation SubBytes in the initial-
ization phase of the algorithm, in which the algorithm works
with the secret key.
2.1 Preparation of Patterns
The goal of this phase is to get the training patterns
of power consumption for the operation AddRoundKey and
SubBytes for all variants of secret key k1 (256 possible
variants). Complete AES algorithm was implemented into
the cryptographic module and the synchronization was per-
formed only for above written operations according to previ-
ously validated knowledge of the algorithm AES and crypto-
graphic module. The program worked in the loop and before
every single round, the data k1 was loaded in the memory of
microprocessor to always work with same input variables.
The program allowed increment or decrement the value of
the key and indicated this operation by sending the value via
serial port to the computer. Synchronization signal and com-
munication with the PC did not affect the power consump-
tion.
Fig. 1 shows the measured power traces matching to
implemented operation AddRoundKey and SubBytes for key
value 1 and 255. Power waveforms are almost identical ex-
cept for two places. The first lies at the beginning of the
trace and corresponds to the operation XOR of the plaint text
and secret key during the AddRoundKey operation. The sec-
ond place is located around the time t = 35000 which corre-
sponds to executing instruction during operation SubBytes.
In Fig. 1, the sections, which are influenced by the change
of the first key byte are clearly recognizable. According to
the information mentioned in Sec. 2, the power traces were
divided into the parts. The numbers indicate the resulting
parts that correspond to the work with bytes that also cor-
respond with steps of the method. Fig. 2 shows resulting
power patterns for all values of the secret key cut for the first
byte. A detail of the power peak is shown in Fig. 3 and it
is clear that measured power traces are greatly synchronized
and divided into several groups, according to the Hamming
weight of the secret key.
Neural networks used for classification in the acous-
tic side channel were trained for specific courses of acoustic
signals [2]. This method requires sufficient differences be-
tween corresponding waveforms and repeatability of acous-
tic trace measurement. These two important assumptions are
not achieved in measured power traces because of two rea-
sons. First, the power traces of each instruction are very sim-
ilar [40]. Second, if we measure power consumption for spe-
cific instructions more times, the resulting power traces are
not completely identical due to the changes in auxiliary reg-
isters of cryptographic module (for example the increment-
ing of program counter register). This property is known as
the electronic noise, which seriously affects the results of
PA. When the attacker is preparing patterns during the attack
phase, it is necessary to reduce electronic noise to a mini-
mum value otherwise the classification achieves bad results.
It can easily happen that measured power trace determined
to classification will be put to another group corresponding
with Hamming weight (Fig. 3). Based on knowledge of PA,
the best way to reduce electronic noise is to repeat the mea-
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surement of power consumption and the subsequent calcu-
lation of average values. Therefore, the power consumption
for different data values was measured more times and sub-
sequently the average power consumption was calculated. It
was experimentally verified that the optimal value of averag-
ing is 16. In reality, this calculation was conducted using the
digital oscilloscope.
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Fig. 1. Measured power traces for two key values.
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Fig. 2. The power pasterns for all key values.
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Fig. 3. Detail of power peak.
2.2 Preparation and Training of NN
The neural network was implemented in Matlab. This
environment provides a wide range of the possibilities for
the implementation of the mathematical methods, signal pro-
cessing, simulation and testing. Another great advantage is
the availability of toolboxes that solves a specific problem.
For the implementation of the neural networks, neural net-
work toolbox called Netlab was used. The authors of this
toolbox are Nabney Ian and Christopher Bishop from As-
ton University in Birmingham. The toolbox is free to down-
load [41]. 256 measured power patterns were imported and
stored in the matrix P in Matlab for subsequent processing.
This chapter describes the main points of implementation.
The created neural network was a typical three-layer neural
network with Backpropagation learning method. The input
layer must have the same number of neurons as the num-
ber of samples in the measured power trace, for our purpose
12,000. Output layer classifies the input vector to key value
and therefore it must contain 256 neurons for all combina-
tions of key values 0 to 255. Hidden layer could contain var-
ious number of neurons depending on the complexity of the
problem. In our implementation, we used 100 neurons in the
hidden layer. Of course, we tested the influence of neurons
in hidden layer from 50 to 256 to the result of classification.
The chosen configuration containing 100 neurons in hidden
layer was balanced in terms of the time demands for learning
and of correct classification. If the hidden layer contained
smaller number of neurons the results of classification were
poor. On the other hand, the results were not better and train-
ing process was much more time-consuming if the number
of neurons was higher. As activation function the standard
sigmoid was chosen (parameter ”logistic” in source code).
The following text contains the most important part of the
program implementation.
%Creation of neural network
nn = mlp(input, hidden, output,’logistic’);
%Setting
options = zeros(1,18);
options(1) = true;
options(14) = iteration;
%Training
[nn, options] = netopt(nn, options, ...
... P, clas, ’scg’);
The program lines correspond to creation, setting and
training of neural network. The training process needs
a classification matrix which determines the correct classi-
fication of a given input to the appropriate key. The size of
the classification matrix was 256×256 because the number
of lines corresponds with the number of NN outputs, and
number of columns corresponds with the number of power
pasterns. Elements equal to 1 in the matrix assign power
patterns to appropriate outputs values. In our case, the clas-
sification matrix was unit matrix. After successful training,
neural networks is ready to carry out the attack phase.
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2.3 Classification of Key Estimates
In the attack phase, the attacker needs to measure at
least one of the power consumption traces of the device un-
der attack. In a real attack, the attacker would measure power
consumption of the cryptographic module and he would try
to isolate the part of algorithm on which neural network is
trained. We assumed that the attacker knows the type of the
attacked cryptographic device and the algorithm. Thus, the
same implementation of the algorithm and the same synchro-
nization signal for training and attack data is used. Provided
the attacker has this option, the power trace measurement
and attack will be easy to perform. This section is consid-
ered as critical and it is important that the data used to train
and attack are synchronized in the same way. Unless, the
attacker has no such possibilities, the attack will be still fea-
sible but the power traces measurement and processing will
be harder. The attacker can measure the whole power trace
of the algorithm and gradual analysis will find the necessary
operations in the power trace. It is not hard to synchronize
this roughly trimmed power trace, for example to the first
power peak. Positive factor affecting the classification results
is compliance to the same procedure of electronic noise re-
duction (described in Sec. 2.2). After a correct power trace
measurement corresponding to the value Ksec, classification
is performed and neural network classifies the first byte of
secret key like the output with the highest probability.
For method verification, we measured once again the
whole set of power traces corresponding to all the secret key
values and this set was subsequently analyzed with the neu-
ral network. In this manner, we obtained the classification
results for all possible key values and the first idea of how
successful the method is. The following part of the source
code shows the classification of measured test data.
for i=1:256
V_total = [V_total; mlpfwd(nn,test(i,:))];
end
The result of analysis for all power traces was matrix
Vtotal of size 255×255. The lines index corresponds to the
value of a secret key Ksec and columns index corresponds to
the value of key estimation Kest . In other words, neural net-
work assigned to measured power trace probability vector
for individual key estimates. Whole matrix Vtotal of classi-
fication is shown graphically in Fig. 4 and for better under-
standing it is the part of the matrix written in Tab. 1.
From Tab. 1, it can be seen that the neural network
classified the power trace corresponding Ksec = 0 with prob-
ability 36.77% to key estimate Kest = 0 and the power trace
corresponding to the secret key 1 classified key estimate 1
with probability 66,42% and so on. Each line of the matrix
Vtotal corresponds to the output probability vector which is
result of power trace classification. Each column contains
probability for individual estimation key value.
Probability of key estimation Kest
0 1 2 3
K
se
c
va
lu
e
... · · · · · · · · · · · ·
6 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
5 0,00% 0,00% 0,08% 0,00%
4 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
3 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 23,79%
2 0,00% 0,00% 6,44% 0,00%
1 0,00% 66,42% 0,00% 0,00%
0 36,77% 0,00% 00,00% 0,00%
Tab. 1. Part of the resulting matrix Vtotal.
To obtain a better understanding of the whole classi-
fication results, the graph displayed in Fig. 5 shows the
classification results (output probability vectors) for the five
randomly chosen secret keys. Appropriate probability vec-
tors for chosen Ksec = 5,41,81,129,248 values are color dis-
tinguished. From Fig. 5, it can be read that the probabil-
ity vector contained five possible key estimations for power
trace Ksec = 5. Classified key estimations were Kest = 5 with
probability 35%, Kest = 18 with probability 5%, Kest = 74
with probability 6%, Kest = 76 with probability 23% and
Kest = 105 with probability 7%. Analogously, probability
for a different secret key value could be determined. Key
estimation with highest probability was always equal to se-
cret key value for this random selected values. These par-
tial results show good functionality of the proposed method.
However, it was necessary to investigate all selected key es-
timations with the highest probability.
Fig. 6 shows the selected highest probability value of
keys estimations for classified power trace corresponding to
all values of the secret key. In other words, which key value
was classified with highest probability for a specific power
trace. The graph is displayed with two Y-axes for better
clarity. X-axis represents secret key values and blue Y-axis
shows the probability of highest selected probability and the
red Y-axis corresponds to the chosen key estimation.
Ksec [value] 2 3 18 84 114 120
Kest [value] 112 33 10 82 106 10
Pmax [%] 8.32 27.77 7.31 19.15 21.23 13.60
∆err [%] 0.44 4.00 0.60 0.50 2.00 2.00
Kta j [value] 151 173 195 199 210 234
Kest [value] 253 171 197 228 202 206
Pmax[%] 31.57 13.23 6.02 6.44 45.59 18.27
∆err [%] 6.17 0.20 1.20 0.80 5.00 2.50
Ksec [value] 149 150 245 251
Kest [value] 249 250 207 223
Pmax[%] 9.20 18.59 7.82 16.60
∆err [%] 1.30 4.50 1.90 6.00
Tab. 2. Classification errors.
The main goal of the method is to have the estimate
key value equal to secret key value after classification. In the
other word, the function Kest = Ksec is true. Shape of this
function is clearly visible at first sight in Fig. 6 and only a
few points interrupt linear progression of the function. These
points are estimates that were wrongly classified, when the
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selected estimate with highest probability did not correspond
to the secret key value (Kest 6= Ksec). From these complete
classification results, very hopeful functionality follows the
method. Enumeration of erroneously classified secret keys
and determined key estimation given in Tab. 2. The highest
probability of key estimation Pmax and difference between
the highest probability and probability for correct estimate
∆err are written in the table. From the obtained data, it is
clear that the value ∆err was really small for every wrong
key estimation. The average value of ∆err was only 2.46%.
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Fig. 4. Graphically depicted complete classification results.
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Fig. 5. Output probability vectors for the five randomly chosen
secret keys.
From the whole proofing set (256 measured power
traces), the neural network classified wrong key estimate six-
teen times. This number of mistakes corresponds to 6.27%
of measured and tested power trace. Therefore, we can de-
clare that the proposed method identified the correct value of
the secret key in 93.72% of cases. The method achieved sim-
ilar results around 90 . . .95% of sucsesful clasification dur-
ing the repeated tests and the classification errors occurred
for key estimate with low value of the highest probability.
This observation is confirmed by the data in Tab. 2, median
of highest probability that led to the wrong classification is
15% and the average value is 17%. We can determine that
for estimates keys classified with a probability lower than
20%, probability of wrong clasification is higher.
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Fig. 7. Histogram of highest probabilities.
The probability of correct key estimate should be as
high as possible to improve the classification results. Fig-
ure 6 shows that the occurrences of probabilities 14%, 18%
and 20% are not an exception. Therefore, it was decided
to analyze the results in detail. Fig. 7 displays a histogram
of selected highest probabilities. From the histogram, it can
be seen that the occurrence of probabilities to 10% oc-
cured twenty-one times and the probability 10− 20% oc-
cured thirty-eight times which was together 59 occurrences
from all 256 values. The total number of potentially pre-
disposed keys to incorrect classification is about 23% which
would mean that the proposed method would work with suc-
cess about 80%. This result is not sufficient enough, there-
fore the optimization of method will be subject to further
research.
A very important and interesting factor, which flows
from the low values ∆err, was that the probability of correct
key estimation was always the second highest probability for
all erroneously classified keys. The example of probability
vector which corresponds to value Ksec = 151 is shown in
Fig. 8. This great feature, the attacker would use for reduc-
tion of the space needed for a brute force attack if it hap-
pened that the key was bad classified at the end of the classi-
fication process. Let us assume that the attacker attacks the
AES algorithm working with 16 bytes (128 bits) secret key
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and after classification of the whole secret key, the attacker
tests decrypt captured cryptogram and from device output,
the nonsensical text appears. In this situations, the attacker
has two possibilities. First, he could check the classification
results and he cloud try for key estimation with lower prob-
ability than 20% the second key estimation. In the worst
case, he would have to try two possibilities for every key
byte. That means that this method reduces the space needed
for a brute force attack from 2128 to 216, which corresponds
to the reduction of 34 orders.
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Fig. 8. Probability vector for Ksec = 151.
3. Repeatability of Realization
We measured ten times larger set of power consump-
tion to analyze a possibility of the method repeatability and
method feasibility. The main goal was to test if the results of
classification are the same for more measured power traces
corresponding to the same secret key value. 2560 power
traces were measured corresponding to all values of the se-
cret key. Ten power traces were independently stored for
each value of the secret key. This power traces were not
measured successively and were not measured in same day
because we wanted to test the impact of workplace recon-
figuration. Created set was classified with neural networks
in the same manner as described in the previous section.
In this way, we obtained the results for all possible secret
key values from independent measurements. The number of
wrong classified key estimation and the overall success rate
are given in the following Tab. 3.
The number of wrong classified Success [%]
key estimation (from 2560)
378 85,23
Tab. 3. Classification errors for 2560 power traces.
For completion of the results, Tab. 4 gives classifica-
tion results for seven selected keys. The first five selected
keys (5, 41 , 81, 129 and 248) correspond to the key selected
in the previous chapters and the selected highest probabili-
ties are almost identical. As an example of incorrect clas-
sifications, the classification results for value Ksec = 19 are
displayed. Selected key estimates were classified with low
probability therefore the neural network wrongly classified
five times from ten power traces measured. The results con-
firmed that repeated measurements do not influence classi-
fication results and it is possible to use the method. In this
case, the proposed method reached 85% of the successful
classification of secret key.
Kta j 5 41 81 129 248 19
Pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s
[%
]
28,74 38,20 79,92 67,46 30,07 7,67
27,21 41,48 79,99 67,68 39,26 17,27
27,10 39,78 80,51 67,87 36,55 11,49
28,96 42,19 80,15 69,02 31,05 9,30
23,03 41,37 79,93 68,02 38,97 7,73
28,81 31,34 77,83 67,94 37,95 12,63
23,75 36,28 80,03 67,83 34,38 8,73
26,95 37,32 77,32 66,56 36,04 13,85
22,02 33,39 80,30 67,91 39,25 8,27
28,44 38,25 80,43 67,99 34,82 7,81
Tab. 4. Results of classification.
4. Future Work
This method achieved similar results around 90% of
the successful classification during the repeated tests but
from the detailed analysis of results it was established that
total number of potentially predisposed keys to incorrect
classification is about 23% which would mean that the pro-
posed method would work with success about 80%. Exper-
iment performed with 2560 power traces reported success
equal to 85% and confirmed this fact. This result is not suf-
ficient enough, therefore optimization of the method will be
proposed. We intend to use the knowledge and experiments
from [4] to increase the difference between the measured
power traces. We have already performed the first test and
the results confirmed that the optimized method is able to
work with success rate around 96% and the correct key es-
timate is determined with probability more than 90% This
optimization will be subject to further research.
The proposed method assumes that the attacker must
know the type of cryptographic module on which he wants
to realize an attack. This requirement is considered criti-
cal and it is important that the data used to train and attack
are synchronized in the same way. If we assume that the
attacker knows the attacked cryptographic device and the al-
gorithm, the same implementation of the algorithm and the
same synchronization signal for training and attack data can
be used. In this case, the realization of the proposed attack
is not difficult. If the attacker has no such possibilities, the
attack will be still feasible but measuring the power traces
and processing will be harder. The attacker can measure the
whole power trace of an algorithm and the gradual analysis
will find the necessary operations in the power trace. It is
not hard to synchronize this roughly trimmed power trace,
for example to the first power peak. These two realizations
of the attack suppose the identical type of the cryptographic
module. Therefore, we want to focus on verification of the
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method for different types of the cryptographic modules in
the future research.
In our first experiment, we focus on the first byte of the
secret key because all subsequent bytes are involved in the
same operations as the first one. Therefore, we are confident
that the proposed method is able to classify the whole AES
secret key from only one measured power trace. However,
we would like to verify the application of only one trained
neural network to classify whole secret key using experimen-
tal testing.
5. Conclusion
This paper presented the innovative method of the
power analysis attack which used the neural network to clas-
sify measured power traces. If we compare our method with
well known methods used in DPA and SPA, the main ad-
vantage is that the method has the ability to determine the
first byte of the secret key with probability around 90% us-
ing only one measured power trace for an algorithm resis-
tant to conventional analysis method or SPA method. This
way of the power analysis is an entirely new approach and is
designed to combine the advantages of simple and differen-
tial power analysis. We proved experimental applicability of
the method on power analysis of the operation AddRoundKey
and operation SubBytes in the initialization phase of the
AES algorithm. The proposed method identified the correct
value of the secret key in 93.72% of cases. In the worst case,
the attacker is able to reduce the space needed for a brute
force attack from 2128 to 216 which corresponds to the re-
duction of 34 orders.
According to the future plans, we would like to im-
prove the correct classification of the method. The improve-
ment will be based on increasing of the difference between
the measured power traces. First tests confirmed that the
method is able to work with success rate around 96% and
the correct key estimate is determined with probability more
than 90% We intend to use our own knowledge and experi-
ments from [4]. In this way, we want to determine the whole
secret key of a cryptographic module only from one mea-
sured power trace.
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